Judicial Review of Elections in Hong Kong: Resolving a Contradiction by Young, SNM
Title Judicial Review of Elections in Hong Kong: Resolving aContradiction
Author(s) Young, SNM
Citation
Judicial Review of Elections in Hong Kong: Resolving a
Contradiction. In Yap, PJ (Ed.), Judicial Review of Elections in
Asia. USA: Routledge, 2016
Issued Date 2016
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/219343
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2655475 
Book chapter in Po Jen Yap (ed), Judicial Review of Elections in Asia (Routledge, forthcoming 2016) 
 1 
Judicial Review of Elections in Hong Kong: Resolving a Contradiction 
Simon N. M. Young* 
 
 
Abstract 
Analysis of judicial review of elections in Hong Kong reveals a contradiction: strong review 
of restrictions on voting and candidacy, but weak review of serious institutional inequalities.  
Weak review occurs when the issue is within the scope of Hong Kong’s political reform 
trajectory and of interest to the Chinese government. Beijing’s assertive role in the 2013-15 
reform exercise may influence courts to adopt an even more deferential posture.  However, 
this should be resisted, as it would fail to accord sufficient importance to entrenched political 
rights and involve unwarranted deference by courts, especially if the reform trajectory has hit 
a wall. 
 
Introduction 
Judicial review of elections in Hong Kong is a relatively recent phenomenon.1  It occurs in a 
unique milieu of entrenched political rights2 and evolving political institutions on a gradual 
course to becoming fully democratic.3  In this milieu, a contradiction has become apparent, 
that while Hong Kong courts are prepared to strike down unreasonable restrictions on voting 
and candidacy, sometimes with significant consequences, they have done very little to impact 
the most unfair and illegitimate aspects of Hong Kong’s electoral systems.  These aspects 
include the functional constituencies that have returned at least half of all legislators since 
1985,4 the 1200 member election committee that nominates and elects the chief executive, 
and the practice of corporate voting used in both the election committee and functional 
constituency elections.   
 From a critical examination of the relevant judicial review case law, this chapter 
explains how the contradiction came about and what sustains it.  It then reflects on how the 
contradiction might be resolved going forwards, particularly after the 2015 failed attempt to 
introduce universal suffrage of the chief executive.5  Two opposite paths of resolution are 
                                                
* I thank Po Jen Yap, Gladys Li, Ernest Ng, Swati Jhaveri, Cora Chan, and Kareem Crayton for their comments 
on an earlier draft of this chapter.  
1 Direct elections to District Boards began only in 1982 (see Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of 
Hong Kong (5th edn OUP 1998) 170; Simon Young, ‘The Meaning of the Right to Vote in Hong Kong’ (1997) 
42 McGill LJ 650, 656-658) and to the Legislative Council (LegCo) in 1991 (see Rowena YF Kwok, Joan YH 
Leung and Ian Scott (eds), Votes Without Power: the Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections 1991 (HKU 
Press 1992) ch 1).  See also Johannes Chan and CL Lim (eds), Law of the Hong Kong Constitution (Sweet & 
Maxwell 2011) ch 8. 
2 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383), s 8, art 21 (HKBORO); The Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, 3d Sess, 7th National People’s Congress, 4 
April 1990, reprinted in 29 ILM 1519, art 26 (Basic Law). 
3 Arts 45 and 68 of the Basic Law, ibid, provide that the methods for selecting the chief executive and electing 
legislators is to be specified in light of the actual situation and in accordance with the principle of gradual and 
orderly progress; the ultimate aim is universal suffrage.  
4 Christine Loh and Civic Exchange (eds), Functional Constituencies: A Unique Feature of the Hong Kong 
Legislative Council (HKU Press 2006) chs 1 & 2. 
5 Realising universal suffrage requires amendment of annex I (chief executive) or annex II (LegCo) of the Basic 
Law (n 2), which in both cases requires two-thirds support of all legislators, the consent of the chief executive, 
and approval by the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress (NPCSC). Annex II was amended in 
2010, though the first attempt in 2005 failed.  See The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, 8th Sess, 10th National People’s Congress, 6 
April 2004; Albert HY Chen, ‘An unexpected breakthrough in Hong Kong’s constitutional reform’ (2010) 40 
HKLJ 259; CL Lim, ‘Right to vote and right to political participation’ in Chan and Lim (n 1) 861-875. 
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discussed.  One sees courts apply political rights even more robustly to chip away at those 
illegitimate aspects mentioned above.  The other sees courts becoming even more deferential, 
declining judicial review of electoral laws on the ground that they are matters best left for 
political negotiations and legislative review.  The chapter notes that the impact of the political 
reform exercise of 2013 to 2015, which was overshadowed by a more assertive role played 
by the Chinese central government, may influence a more deferential approach in the future. 
However arguments are made for why courts should resist taking such a path. 
 
 
The Making of a Contradiction 
Article 21 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (HKBOR) guarantees that every permanent 
resident has the ‘right and the opportunity… (a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives; [and] (b) to vote and to be elected at 
genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by 
secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors…’  As it is based on 
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Hong Kong 
courts have made reference to the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee’s General 
Comment 25 in interpreting the rights in Article 21.6  The rights can be restricted so long as 
the restrictions are not ‘unreasonable’ and do not make distinctions based on ‘race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status’ (non-discrimination clause).  
 From 1991 to 2015, there have been approximately 16 judicial review cases in which 
electoral rights in Article 21 (and/or Article 26 of the Basic Law) have been considered.  The 
courts have been robust in striking down residency requirements for candidacy, exclusions in 
village elections, and criminal law related disqualifications for voting and candidacy.  The 
courts have been far more reluctant, however, to address systemic inequalities and unfairness 
in core electoral institutions and practices.  These institutions deny a vast part of the voting 
population an equal opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs and condone 
breaches of the ‘one person, one vote’ principle and significant disparities in voting power; 
but, the courts have found that these practices are not unreasonable or do not engage the 
political right guaranteed.  This apparent contradictory approach to judicial review of 
elections begs the questions of whether the courts have been inconsistent in their approach or 
whether other reasons can be offered as an explanation. 
 
Strong review of restrictions 
TEN YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT 
In the first Article 21 judicial review, Mr Lau San Ching persuaded the High Court to strike 
down a requirement of being ordinarily resident for 10 years preceding the date of 
nomination for District Board candidacy.7  He won his case on two grounds: first, he met the 
10-year requirement even though for a good part of that period he was imprisoned in a 
mainland jail for sedition; second, the 10-year requirement violated the right to be elected and 
was neither rationally connected nor proportionate to a legitimate aim. To assess the 
reasonableness of the restriction, Justice Peter Cheung applied a rigorous three-step 
restrictions test modeled on the approach applied in Canada, by the European Court on 
Human Rights (ECtHR) and the UN Human Rights Committee.8  He found the ‘clearest 
                                                
6 UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), ‘General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, 
voting rights and the right of equal access to public service (Art. 25)’, adopted 12 July 1996, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7. 
7 Lau San Ching v Apollonia Liu (1995) 5 HKPLR 23 (HC). 
8 ibid 49-50. 
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indication’ of irrationality in the differential treatment of voters: permanent residents did not 
have to satisfy an additional residency requirement in order to vote.9  His response to an 
argument for judicial deference to Hong Kong’s unique circumstance was sharp: ‘Even taken 
into account the political situation of Hong Kong…and the historical context in which the 
Electoral Provisions Ordinance was enacted, by no means of imagination can it be said that 
[the requirement] is consistent with Article 21’.10  He referred to significantly shorter 
residency requirements in Canada, Australia and New Zealand as examples of ways of 
achieving the aims of having local connection and knowledge by less restrictive means.11  A 
LegCo select committee may have conducted periodic reviews of the residency requirement, 
but the judge pointed out the absence of evidence that those reviews took into account the 
implications of Article 21.12  The government did not appeal.  The case set a liberal tone for 
Article 21 review. 
 
VILLAGE REPRESENTATIVE ELECTIONS 
The same robust approach resonated in the first Article 21 case before the Court of Final 
Appeal after 1997.  The case of Secretary for Justice v Chan Wah concerned the election of 
village representatives for the over 600 villages in the New Territories.13  The two applicants 
were born, raised and had resided in their respective villages, but could not vote or stand as a 
candidate in their village election.  This was because they were not indigenous villagers, i.e. 
they were not descendants through the male line of a person who resided in an established 
village in 1898.14  No legislation governed village elections but the practice was that only 
indigenous villagers could serve as village representatives.  Since approval by the Secretary 
for Home Affairs resulted in the elected person serving as village representative and possibly 
other roles in different statutory bodies, this conferred sufficient government connection for 
bringing the challenge under Article 21(a).15   
 The Court found that village representatives engaged in the ‘conduct of public affairs’ 
and to exclude villagers like the applicants from voting or running in village elections was an 
unreasonable restriction on the right and opportunity to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs.16  Whether a restriction was reasonable had to be ‘considered objectively’ and the 
question might be answered differently from era to another.17  Chief Justice Andrew Li 
reasoned simply.  Since a village representative was someone who ‘is to and in fact does 
represent the village as a whole (comprising both the indigenous and non-indigenous 
villagers) and further has a role to play beyond the village level, the restriction on the ground 
of not being indigenous cannot be considered a reasonable restriction’.18  Arguments based 
on the ‘principle of gradual and orderly progress’ in Article 68 of the Basic Law and the 
opportunities provided by District Councils for the conduct of public affairs were dismissed 
shortly as being irrelevant.19  The decision had transformative consequences since the 
government had to devise a new scheme of village elections, consult extensively on the new 
scheme, and enact the necessary legislation; the whole process from the Court’s decision 
                                                
9 ibid 66. 
10 ibid. 
11 ibid 65. 
12 ibid 67. 
13 Secretary for Justice v Chan Wah (2000) 3 HKCFAR 459. 
14 ibid 465. 
15 ibid 467-471.  
16 ibid 472-473. 
17 ibid 474.  
18 ibid. 
19 ibid. 
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until the first village elections under the new legislation took approximately two and a half 
years.20 
 
PRISONER DISQUALIFICATION CASES 
A final set of cases to illustrate the courts’ strong review of restrictions on voting and 
candidacy is the prisoners or criminal law related disqualification cases.  Prisoner 
disenfranchisement cases have been politically controversial in many places.  In the United 
Kingdom, despite more than a decade after the ECtHR (Grand Chamber)’s 2005 judgment in 
Hirst v The United Kingdom, there has yet to be legislative reform to remove or minimise the 
ban on prisoners’ voting.21  The experience in Hong Kong has been very different. 
 In Chan Kin Sum v Secretary for Justice, the three applicants (a legislator and two 
prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for offences of robbery) applied to the court to have 
struck down the blanket bans on persons sentenced to or serving a term of imprisonment of 
any length from voting and registering to vote in LegCo elections.22  Remanded persons 
awaiting trial were also barred from voting, not by law, but simply because no arrangements 
had been made to allow them to vote while detained.  The court found the bans on voting and 
registering violated the prisoners’ right to vote as protected by Article 21 of the HKBOR and 
Article 26 of the Basic Law.  It also declared that the Electoral Affairs Commission had a 
statutory duty to make all necessary arrangements to enable registered remanded persons held 
in custody to vote on an election day.23 
 In identifying the proper restrictions test to be applied, Justice Andrew Cheung 
followed Lau San Ching’s proportionality test and rejected less rigorous approaches, such as 
a Wednesbury reasonableness test.24  He stated: ‘In a society governed by the rule of law, the 
courts must be vigilant in the protection of fundamental rights and must vigorously examine 
any restriction that may be placed on them’.25  The judge noted the breadth of the restriction, 
which applied not only to imprisoned convicted persons, but also to those on bail pending 
appeal, those serving a suspended sentence, and parolees.  Citing authorities from Canada, 
Australia, the ECtHR, and South Africa, all of which upheld similar challenges, the judge 
noted, ‘the modern trend is against disenfranchisement’.26 The statement in Chan Wah that 
determinations of reasonableness may vary from era to era was used to reason that the 
position at the time of the decision in 2009 ‘may well be very different from that in 1997 
when [the law was passed] in the infancy of the HKSAR’.27  The court was critical of the 
absence of evidence from government on the rational connection between the restriction and 
the legitimate aims of crime prevention, and enhancing civic responsibility and respect for 
the rule of law.28  The court concluded: ‘the general, automatic and indiscriminate restrictions 
on the right to vote and the right to register as an elector cannot be justified under the 
proportionality test’.29 
                                                
20 See Village Representative Election Ordinance (Cap 576); Lai Tak Shing v The Secretary for Home Affairs 
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 655, [7]-[10]; Swati Jhaveri and Anne Scully-Hill, ‘Executive and legislative reactions to 
judicial declarations of constitutional invalidity in Hong Kong: Engagement, acceptance or avoidance?’ (2015) 
13 International Journal of Constitutional Law 507, 517-519. 
21 Hirst v The United Kingdom (2006) 42 EHRR 41; Alexander Home and Isobel White, ‘Prisoners’ voting 
rights’, UK House of Commons Library, Standard Note SN/PC/01764, 11 February 2015. 
22 Chan Kin Sum v Secretary for Justice [2009] 2 HKLRD 166 (CFI). 
23 Chan Kin Sum Simon v Secretary for Justice, unreported judgment on relief, HCAL79/2008, 11 March 2009, 
CFI, [32]; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223, 230 & 234 (HL). 
24 Chan Kin Sum (n 22) [72]-[73]. 
25 ibid [81]. 
26 ibid [110]. 
27 ibid [111]. 
28 ibid [139]-[140]. 
29 ibid [164]. 
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 The court’s treatment of arguments for deference is noteworthy.  The argument for 
deference due to Hong Kong’s unique context and gradual development towards full 
democracy was turned on its head.  The judge stated, ‘where only 50% of the LegCo 
members are elected by universal suffrage, that makes the right to vote doubly important and 
precious.’30  The argument for deference because the matter concerned questions of ‘penal 
philosophy and policy’ was brushed aside since the court recognised that it was not being 
asked to draw the line of reasonableness, which is for the legislature and executive, but to 
examine the restrictions and decide whether they are unreasonable.31  An argument for 
deference or a margin of appreciation was also made on the basis that LegCo had considered 
relaxing the restrictions on previous occasions but rejected it.  The court accepted that due 
respect and deference should be paid to these legislative choices; however, this did not 
immunise the provisions from scrutiny and the court still had to exercise its constitutional 
role of examining ‘the choices, as made, closely and see whether the restrictions on voting 
rights…can be justified’.32  After paying due respect and deference, it made no difference in 
the result.33 
 The court made clear it was not saying no restrictions could be imposed on prisoners’ 
voting, but where to draw the line was a matter for government.34  In order to give 
government the time and space to consult the public and pass new legislation, the judge, on 
the government’s application, ordered a temporary suspension of its declarations for 
approximately seven and a half months.35  The temporary suspension meant that the status 
quo would effectively continue and government could not be found in contempt for non-
compliance during the period of suspension.36  In effect the temporary suspension served as a 
catalyst for government action.  In contrast to events in the UK, the Hong Kong government 
consulted the public and passed legislation not to impose any restrictions, in accordance with 
public opinion and the court’s judgment, all within the suspension period.37 
 The other two cases concern criminal law related disqualifications for candidacy.  In 
Tse Hung Hing v The Medical Council of Hong Kong, the applicant was a doctor who wanted 
to be elected to serve as a member of the Medical Council, a public body whose affairs came 
within the meaning of ‘public affairs’ in Article 21(a).38  But since he had a conviction for 
careless driving, for which he was fined HK$1000, he was disqualified from being nominated 
because he had been convicted in Hong Kong of any offence punishable with imprisonment 
(careless driving being punishable up to six months imprisonment).  On the heels of the Chan 
Kin Sum decision, the judge in a short judgment accepted the parties agreed position that the 
restriction violated Article 21(a).39  While the aim of the restriction to ensure that Council 
members are trustworthy persons of high moral probity was legitimate, the indiscriminate 
                                                
30 ibid [106]. 
31 ibid [148]-[149]. 
32 ibid [156]. 
33 See analysis by Cora Chan, ‘Judicial deference at work: some reflections on Chan Kin Sum and Kong Yun 
Ming’ (2010) 40 HKLJ 1, 11. 
34 Chan Kin Sum Simon (relief) (n 23) [165]. 
35 ibid [87]. 
36 Koo Sze Yiu v Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2006) 9 HKCFAR 441, [33]. 
37 See Voting by Imprisoned Persons Ordinance, Ord 7 of 2009, partially in force on 3 July 2009 (LN 162 of 
2009), fully on 30 October 2009 (LN 216 of 2009); LegCo Secretariat, ‘Voting rights of prisoners’, paper for 
Panel on Constitutional Affairs meeting on 18 May 2009, LC Paper No CB(2)1539/08-09(01); ‘Voting by 
Imprisoned Persons Ordinance fully beings today’, HKSAR Government Press Release, 30 October 2009, 
accessible at <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200910/30/P200910300146.htm> accessed August 2015; 
Jhaveri and Scully-Hill (n 20) 519-522. 
38 Tse Hung Hing v The Medical Council of Hong Kong [2010] 1 HKLRD 111, [7] (CFI). 
39 ibid [8]. 
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means was disproportionate as exemplified by the facts of the case, where the conviction was 
minor and of ‘no apparent relevance to the applicant’s suitability to be a Council member.’40 
 Wong Hin Wai v Secretary for Justice was heard and decided expeditiously, a few 
months before the September 2012 LegCo elections.41  Both applicants wanted to be 
candidates in this election but were disqualified because they had been recently convicted of 
minor offences and sentenced to short terms of imprisonment.42  Although granted bail 
pending appeal, the disqualification still applied to them because their sentence of 
imprisonment had yet to be served or pardoned.  The court held the restriction to be 
unconstitutional, finding no rational connection or proportionality between the restriction, 
when applied to persons on bail pending appeal and sentenced to less than 3 months 
imprisonment, and the aim of maintaining public confidence in LegCo and the electoral 
process.43    
 While the court’s approach could be said to be rigorous, there are two important 
differences in Justice Johnson Lam’s approach in this case when compared to that of Justice 
Cheung in Chan Kin Sum.  First, Justice Lam was more influenced by recent ECtHR 
authorities that emphasised a wide margin of appreciation, which a court of supranational 
jurisdiction would be expected to adopt in respect of member states in cases concerning 
democratic rights.44  This led Justice Lam to apply a different ‘proportionality test’ that does 
not assess whether the restriction was ‘no more than necessary’.45  Instead the restriction 
should not ‘curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence or to 
deprive them of their effectiveness’, words taken from the ECtHR case law.46  The court 
‘must also have regard to the historical and current state of political development in Hong 
Kong’.47  This suggests a more deferential test of proportionality, especially with the 
endorsement of what Lord Collins said in R (Barclay) v Lord Chancellor, that electoral 
‘features which would be unacceptable in the context of one system may be justified in the 
context of another’.48  The approach signals the end of comparative law assistance.  Justice 
Lam did not address an important point made in Chan Kin Sum that the strong proportionality 
test (as applied in equality cases) would still need to be applied if the challenge was based on 
an Article 1(1) distinction, i.e. the non-discrimination clause. 49   In the by-election 
disqualification case, concerned with a newly enacted provision that disqualified LegCo 
members, who resign from office, from being a candidate in the by-election for the same seat 
within a six-month period from the date of resignation, Justice Thomas Au in Kwok Cheuk 
Kin v Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs also applied the more deferential 
proportionality test: ‘the court should only interfere if it finds that, upon scrutiny, the 
restriction is manifestly without justifiable foundation’.50   
 The second departure from what was said in Chan Kin Sum is in the treatment of 
legislative history and debates.  Justice Cheung stated that deference should be accorded to 
                                                
40 ibid. 
41 Wong Hin Wai v Secretary for Justice [2012] 4 HKLRD 70 (CFI). 
42 Mr Wong Hin Wai later had his conviction quashed in the Court of Final Appeal, see HKSAR v Wong Hin 
Wai (2013) 16 HKCFAR 837. 
43 Wong Hin Wai (n 41) [95] & [96]. 
44 ibid [21]-[29] & [34]. 
45 ibid [34]. 
46 ibid [35]. 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid, citing R (Barclay) v Lord Chancellor [2010] 1 AC 464, [56] (UKSC). 
49 Chan Kin Sum (n 22) [74], now partially qualified by Fok Chun Wa v The Hospital Authority (2012) 15 
HKCFAR 409, [61]-[78]. 
50 Kwok Cheuk Kin v Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs [2014] 2 HKLRD 283, [50] (CFI).  
Note the similarity to the Wednesbury unreasonableness test (n 23). 
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the mere fact that the legislature had considered the matter without going too closely into 
what was actually said during the debates: ‘one should be very slow, in a domestic context, to 
evaluate the quality of the legislative debate, particularly with a view to lowering the 
deference or respect that the courts should have, in a given case, for the choice made by the 
legislature.  That is, generally speaking, no business of the courts.’51  However, Justice Lam 
assessed the quality of the debates held in 1997 when he noted that legislators were 
‘unwittingly misled’ by the administration on the purpose and effect of the amended 
restriction.52  For Justice Lam, this meant that the legislature had not properly considered the 
implications of the Article 21 right and thus little if any weight could be attached to the 
‘judgment of the legislature’.53   In conditioning deference to whether there had been 
legislative consideration of rights implications, the approach of Justice Lam was similar to 
that seen in Lau San Ching.54  By contrast, in the by-election disqualification case, Justice Au 
held that the court ‘will be slow to interfere’ when the challenged provision is the ‘result of 
active and full debate in LegCo where competing interests were presented’.55   
 The government chose not to appeal Wong Hin Wai, and as with the first prisoners’ 
right to vote case they chose to conduct a public consultation in July 2014 on different 
options for reform.56  Though Wong Hin Wai is counted as a strong review case, it shows the 
signs of a more deferential approach to review.  It will need to be left to future cases to reach 
greater clarity on the two issues of the intensity of the proportionality test and the proper 
consideration of the quality of legislative debates in assessing weight to be accorded to 
legislative choices. 
 
Weak review of institutional inequality 
As a society transitioning to full democracy, there are a number of institutional aspects of the 
political system that appear unfair and illegitimate from the standpoint of the fundamental 
right to vote.  Criticisms are typically directed at the functional constituencies, which were 
introduced by the British in 1985, retained by the Chinese government after 1997 and 
replicated in the system of sectors and subsectors in the election committee for the chief 
executive.  The functional constituencies are criticised for privileging business, industry and 
professional groups with additional political power and representation.  These criticisms were 
voiced by many of the young protesters during the 79-day long Occupy Central protests in 
the second half of 2014.57  In its periodic review of Hong Kong’s compliance with the 
ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee has criticised Hong Kong’s political system for 
falling short of Article 21 requirements.58 
                                                
51 Chan Kin Sum (n 22) [154].  See criticisms in Chan (n 33) 13; PY Lo, The Judicial Construction of Hong 
Kong’s Basic Law (HKU Press 2014) 297-311. 
52 Wong Hin Wai (n 41) [57]-[62] & [79]. 
53 ibid [99]. 
54 Lau San Ching (n 7). 
55 Kwok Cheuk Kin (n 50) [94(4)]. 
56 See Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau (CMAB), Consultation Paper on Disqualification of 
Candidates with Unserved Prison Sentences and other Related Matters, 21 July 2014; CMAB, ‘Results of the 
public consultation on disqualification of candidates with unserved prison sentences and other related matters 
and proposed way forward’, paper for Panel on Constitutional Affairs, November 2014, LC Paper No 
CB(2)267/14-15(03). 
57 SCMP Editorial, ‘Government must reach out to young to win their trust and support’, South China Morning 
Post, 10 November 2014; Chris Buckley and Michael Forsythe, ‘Hong Kong’s Democracy Supporters Chafe at 
Inequality and Beijing’s Sway’, International New York Times, 27 June 2014. 
58 UNHRC, ‘Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region’, 86 Sess, UN Doc CCPR/CHKG/CO/2, 21 April 2006, [18]; UNHRC, ‘Concluding observations on the 
third periodic report of Hong Kong, China, adopted by the Committee at its 107th session (11-28 March 2013)’, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/3, 29 April 2013, [6]. 
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FUNCTIONAL CONSTITUENCIES 
When functional constituencies were introduced, they brought diversity to a legislature made 
up solely of appointed and official members. 59   Members returned by functional 
constituencies and a new electoral college made up 42 per cent of all legislators in 1985.60  It 
was not until 1991 with the introduction of 18 directed elected seats (to replace the electoral 
college seats) that unfairness with the functional seats became apparent.  While all registered 
voters had one vote to elect a geographical constituency member, some 69,825 registered 
voters (consisting of individuals and corporate bodies) had a second vote in the functional 
constituencies and thus a second representative in the legislature.61   
 The proportion of registered voters that had a second vote/representative widened to 
over one million in 1995, with Governor Chris Patten’s controversial reforms, but this 
expansion was short-lived and rolled back to 138,984 (127,075 individuals and 11,909 
bodies) in the 1998 election.62  The inequality of some having two votes continued in this 
extreme form in the 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections.63  But for the 2012 election, as a result of 
a successful, but controversial, tri-partite negotiation, the inequality was removed by giving 
excluded voters a second vote in a new functional constituency in which only elected district 
council members could be nominated.64  The five seats in this new district council functional 
constituency were known as ‘super seats’ because they had an electorate base of 3.2 million 
voters without any geographical delimitation.65 China required functional and geographical 
seats to be in equal proportion,66 but this reform in substance increased the proportion of 
popularly elected legislators to 57 per cent. 
 Even with the 2012 reform to extend a functional vote to all voters, there remains the 
problem of the gross disparity in voting power as between voters in differently sized 
functional constituencies.  There are 12 traditional functional constituencies with less than 
1,000 registered voters.67  The smallest is Insurance, which consists of 135 authorised 
insurance companies.  The other 11 also comprise of companies in different sectors of 
business, trade and industry.  These small constituencies do not typically hold contested 
elections since leadership can be decided by consultation and consensus.68  The largest 
amongst the traditional functional constituencies has always been Education (comprised of 
teachers) whose size was 92,957 in 2012.69  Other large constituencies tend to consist of 
individuals practicing different professions.70   With the new District Council (second) 
                                                
59 Miners (n 1) 114-117. 
60 ibid 116. 
61 Young (n 1) 666. 
62 ibid 667-668; Loh and Civic Exchange (n 4) app 5. 
63 Loh and Civic Exchange, ibid; Electoral Affairs Commission (EAC), Report on the 2008 Legislative Council 
Election Held on 7 September 2008, Hong Kong, 4 December 2008, app IV. 
64 EAC, Report on the 2012 Legislative Council Election Held on 9 September 2012, Hong Kong, 22 November 
2012, p 2 ([1.4]). 
65 ibid 2 & app X(B). 
66 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for 
Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative 
Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal 
Suffrage, 35th Sess, 10th National People’s Congress, 29 December 2007, [1]. 
67 EAC (n 64) app IV. 
68 Simon NM Young, ‘Elected by the elite: functional constituency legislators and elections’ in Loh and Civic 
Exchange (n 4) 133-134. 
69 EAC (n 64) app IV. 
70 Simon NM Young and Anthony Law, ‘Privileged to vote: inequalities and anomalies of the FC system’ in 
Loh and Civic Exchange (n 4) 80. 
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constituency, the largest functional constituency now has 643,951 registered voters per 
legislator.71   
 There has only been one judicial review (Lee Miu Ling v Attorney General) directed 
at the functional constituencies.72  In 1994, two applicants brought an Article 21 challenge to 
the Patten reformed functional constituencies, which had over a million registered functional 
voters and no corporate voters.  As neither applicant had a functional vote, they challenged 
the functional constituencies for being in breach of the one person, one vote principle and for 
disparities in voting power (if indeed they had a functional vote).  The High Court and Court 
of Appeal dismissed their challenge, and petition for leave to appeal to the Privy Council was 
refused.73   
 In respect of the ‘one person, one vote’ challenge, Justice Bokhary in the Court of 
Appeal found that paragraph (3) of Article VII of the Letters Patent was a specific provision 
that insulated functional constituencies from Article 21(b) review.74  The paragraph provided 
that nothing in Article VII ‘shall be construed as precluding the making of laws which, as 
regards the election of the Members of the Legislative Council, confer on persons generally 
or persons of a particular description any entitlement to vote which is in addition to a vote in 
respect of a geographical constituency’.75  It was intended to qualify paragraph (5) of that 
same article, which entrenched the HKBOR and repealed laws made after 1991 that were 
inconsistent with the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong.76  Thus the court found the Article 21 
rights were not engaged and no question of reasonable restriction had to be addressed.  After 
the 2012 reform, which conferred both functional and geographical votes on all voters, this 
issue has now become academic.  
  As for the unequal voting power challenge, the court addressed the issue of whether 
the disparity was an unreasonable restriction.  Justice Bokhary reduced the test to a question 
of would ‘sensible and fair-minded people condemn [the] arrangement as irrational or 
disproportionate’.77  This is a high threshold, implying a light approach to proportionality, 
less rigorous than what was applied in Lau San Ching and Chan Kin Sum, although similar to 
the test articulated in Wong Hin Wai and Kwok Cheuk Kin.  As it was in the ‘very nature’ of 
functional constituencies ‘to vary in size’, they could not be faulted from the standpoint of 
‘sensible and fair-minded people’.78  The court was not interested in assessing whether it was 
possible to allocate seats to the constituencies in a fairer manner; as Justice Godfrey 
remarked, ‘that…is a matter with which this court can have nothing to do’.79  This is true if 
what his Lordship meant was that the court should not attempt to redraw the constituency 
lines (like attempting to draw the line of which prisoners could be lawfully disenfranchised).  
As with the prisoners’ right to vote cases, if, by applying a rigorous proportionality test, it 
was found reasonably practicable to devise a more rights compliant arrangement then the ball 
could be thrown back to government to come up with a better scheme.80  This would be the 
beginning of a judicial-government dialogue that would lead to a position consistent with 
human rights requirements yet reflective of societal interests.81   
                                                
71 EAC (n 64). 
72 Lee Miu Ling v Attorney General [1996] 1 HKC 124 (CA), aff’g (1995) 5 HKPLR 181 (HC). 
73 Leave to Privy Council was refused 6 June 1996 (Lords Goff, Steyn and Hoffmann). 
74 Lee Miu Ling (CA) (n 72). 
75 ibid 133. 
76 ibid 132. 
77 ibid 130. 
78 ibid 131. 
79 ibid 134. 
80 See Young (n 1) 719-720. 
81 See generally Po Jen Yap, Constitutional Dialogue in Common Law Asia (OUP 2015). 
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 It is interesting to note that the court was not prepared to show deference to 
government simply because of Hong Kong’s ‘embryonic stage’ of democratic development.82  
However, the court noted the drastic political consequences of declaring functional 
constituencies unconstitutional, before putting the concern to one side.83  It would invalidate 
the legislature and, as Justice Bokhary remarked light-heartedly, ‘so much for local 
democracy’ since English legislation would be needed to pass the new legislature law.84  
These consequences would be of less concern today.  In 2006, the Court of Final Appeal held 
that when a court is prepared to strike down legislation for unconstitutionality it also has the 
power to suspend the declaration of invalidity for a fixed period.85  This remedy was ordered 
in Chan Kin Sum with positive consequences for law-making.86  However, given the need to 
have complete confidence in the legality of the legislature and its actions pending corrective 
legislation, it would probably be necessary to seek a temporary validity order to protect the 
legislature in the interim period.87  It remains unsettled, however, whether Hong Kong courts 
have the power to make such an order.88 
 
CORPORATE VOTING 
Corporate voting was an original feature of the functional constituencies. In delineating these 
constituencies, well-established trade and business organisations were used as reference 
points for conferring votes on the membership of such organisations.  Naturally many of 
these umbrella organisations had corporate members.  For example, the Hong Kong General 
Chamber of Commerce’s corporate members constitute the electors of the Commercial (First) 
constituency, the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce’s corporate members constitute the 
electors of the Commercial (Second) constituency, the Federation of Hong Kong Industries’ 
corporate members constitute the electors of the Industrial (First) constituency, and so on.89  
In 1998, functional constituencies, such as Transport and Agriculture and Fisheries, were 
added and given corporate electors by directly listing them in a schedule within primary 
legislation.90 
 Hong Kong is probably the only place that allows companies and other bodies to vote, 
alongside individual voters, in the election of its legislative members.  As mentioned earlier, 
the corporate voters tend to populate the smaller sized constituencies, which do not typically 
hold contested elections.91  Their representatives tend to put their respective sector’s interest 
before the interest of the general public, even though they have constitutional responsibilities 
as legislators that go beyond the interests of their sector.92  They are said by government to 
provide balanced participation in the legislature and contribute to sustaining Hong Kong’s 
                                                
82 Lee Miu Ling (CA) (n 72) 129. 
83 ibid 128. 
84 ibid. 
85 Koo Sze Yiu (n 36). 
86 Chan Kin Sum Simon (relief) (n 32). 
87 See the similar state of necessity in Re Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 SCR 721.  
88 Koo Sze Yiu (n 36) [32]-[33]; ibid [89]-[91]; Vallejos Evangeline Banao v Commissioner of Registration 
[2011] 6 HKC 469, [9] (CFI). 
89 Loh and Civic Exhange (n 4) apps 2 & 3. 
90 ibid. 
91 ibid apps 9 & 26. 
92 See Mandy Tam Heung Man v The Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants [2008] 1 HKLRD 
238, [97] (CFI): the elected representative from the Accountancy functional constituency ‘has a number of 
constitutional responsibilities, primarily set out in Article 73 of the Basic Law.  These constitutional 
responsibilities plainly extend beyond the scope of matters affecting the professional interests of the 
accountancy profession.’ 
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capitalist system.93  They are also typically known as ‘pro-establishment legislators’ given 
their tendency to support both the Hong Kong and central governments on policy matters.94 
 Corporate voting in LegCo has often been criticised.  To give functional 
constituencies more credibility, Governor Patten abolished corporate voting for the 1995 
election, giving the votes to the directors of the previously enfranchised companies.95  There 
are two main criticisms generally directed at corporate voting.  First, as a result of inadequate 
safeguards, one corporate voter through the vehicle of subsidiaries and other controlled 
entities can effectively have more than one vote in breach of the one person, one vote 
principle.96  It is well known that this already happens with many large conglomerates.97  In 
constituencies with only corporate electors, the potential unfairness of this lapse is mitigated 
somewhat by the fact that each corporate voter has the same chance to pack the constituency 
with their own controlled entities.  But some constituencies have mixed corporate and 
individual voters and the ability of individuals to pack constituencies with controlled 
corporate entities will be much less than that of large enterprises. 98  
 The second criticism is that the qualifying conditions for corporate voting are less 
strict than those for individual voting.99  Corporate bodies vote by authorising a person to 
vote on its behalf and that authorised representative can be any employee or member of the 
body.100  The problem arises because the qualifying conditions for voting apply only to the 
authorised representative and not to the corporate body itself.  Take the permanent residency 
requirement as an example.  Individuals must be permanent residents before they can qualify 
to vote.  For corporate voters the authorised representatives must be a permanent resident, but 
the corporate body itself need not have any ties to Hong Kong.101  So foreign consular posts, 
international organisations, agencies of foreign government, through their membership in 
commerce and trade umbrella organisations, could register to vote, until these loopholes were 
closed by amendments made in 2011 and 2012.102   
 In a judicial review challenging the constitutionality of corporate voting (Chan Yu 
Nam v Secretary for Justice),103 the applicants were a taxi driver and renovation worker who 
did not have the right to vote in any functional constituency.104  Their main argument was 
that conferring the vote in LegCo elections on corporate bodies, which are incapable of 
having permanent residency status, was inconsistent with Article 26 of the Basic Law and 
Article 21 of the HKBOR, which only allow the right to vote to be given to individual 
permanent residents.  It was also argued that corporate voting discriminated against 
individuals who lacked the financial means to form companies and thereby enjoy the 
additional political rights of corporate electors.  The Court of First Instance and Court of 
                                                
93 HKSAR Government, Green Paper on Constitutional Development (Hong Kong July 2007) 10 & 36, but see 
Jake van der Kamp, ‘Functional constituencies undermine our economy’, South China Morning Post, 9 
February 2014. 
94 Loh and Civic Exchange (n 4) 4-5. 
95 Young and Law (n 70) 71-72; Young (n 1) 667-668. 
96 Young and Law, ibid 98-99. 
97 Loh and Civic Exchange (n 4) app 13. 
98 Young and Law (n 70) 99. 
99 ibid 95-98. 
100 ibid 96. 
101 ibid 101. 
102  Legislative Council (Amendment) Ordinance 2011, Ord 2 of 2011, s 14; Electoral Legislation 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Ordinance 2012, Ord 11 of 2012, s 34. 
103 Chan Yu Nam v Secretary for Justice [2010] 1 HKC 493 (CFI). 
104 The Transport constituency only specified corporate bodies as voters; the second applicant had to be an 
individual or corporate voting member of the Real Estate Developers Association of Hong Kong, The Hong 
Kong Construction Association Ltd or The Hong Kong E&M Contractors’ Association Ltd in order to have a 
vote in the Real Estate and Construction constituency. 
 12 
Appeal rejected the challenge,105 and both the Court of Appeal and Court of Final Appeal 
refused leave to appeal.106  In the brief reasons of the appeal committee of the final court, the 
Court of Appeal’s conclusion that Article 26 did not preclude corporate voting was found to 
be supported by the references to ‘corporate bodies’ in the annexes of the Basic Law, the 
‘history of legislative constitutional development in Hong Kong’ and relevant extrinsic 
materials used as an aid to constitutional interpretation.107   
 The case raised an important question about the scope of application of the rights 
protected in Articles 26 and 21, specifically whether they applied to functional constituency 
elections.  The first instance judge, Justice Cheung (surprisingly the same judge in Chan Kin 
Sum) held that the rights did not apply to this type of election; but if they did, he accepted the 
applicants’ submission that the right was engaged and the issue would be whether the 
restriction could be justified.108  In the Court of Appeal, Vice-President Frank Stock, without 
deciding the correctness of Justice Cheung’s decision on this point, postulated an ‘alternative 
and tenable view’ to reaching the same result.109  His alternative view was that Article 26 
‘inalienably accorded to permanent residents…the right, through elections, to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs of the Region’, but without precluding government from conferring 
the right on anyone else.110  Although not explicitly stated, his Lordship was apparently 
attempting to read the rights in Article 26 harmoniously with the rights in Article 21(a) and 
(b) of the HKBOR.  He summarised his view in the following passage, which was 
emphasised in his subsequent leave decision and endorsed in the Court of Final Appeal:111 
 
What is clear is that art. 26 is part of a mosaic which includes arts. 45, 68 and 
Annexes I and II of the Basic Law the effect of which is that in the early years of 
Hong Kong’s new constitutional dispensation, there is room for participation through 
election in public affairs by all permanent residents but for a simultaneous 
continuation beyond 1997 of corporate participation in such affairs by or through 
major organizations and associations at elections.112 
 
While Stock VP was reluctant to reject outright Justice Cheung’s approach, which effectively 
immunises functional constituencies from Article 26 (and Article 21 of the HKBOR) review, 
the reference in the above passage to ‘room for participation through election in public 
affairs’ implies a broader interpretation of Article 26.  According to this view, Article 26 
applies to functional constituency and other elections, but, based on textual and contextual 
considerations, cannot be construed to preclude the continuity of corporate voting as 
originally conceived in the functional constituency system.   This must be the better view 
since Cheung J’s holding significantly narrows the scope of political rights, an approach 
inconsistent with giving fundamental rights a generous and purposive interpretation.   
 Stock VP’s approach to Article 26 is also more aligned with the Court of Appeal’s 
approach in Lee Miu Ling, which did not categorically hold the non-application of Article 21 
to functional constituencies.  This approach gives effect to the rights in Article 26 ‘in 
accordance with law’, that law by virtue of Article 39 of the Basic Law includes the ICCPR 
as applied to Hong Kong, taking into account Justice Brian Keith’s approach in Lee Miu Ling 
                                                
105 Chan Yu Nam v Secretary for Justice [2012] 3 HKC 38 (CA), aff’g Chan Yu Nam (CFI) (n 103). 
106 Chan Yu Nam v Secretary for Justice, unreported, FAMV39/2011, 18 January 2012, CFA AC; Chan Yu Nam 
v Secretary for Justice, unreported, CACV3/2010, 21 October 2011, CA. 
107 Chan Yu Nam (CFA AC) ibid [5]. 
108 Chan Yu Nam (CFI) (n 103) [61]-[65] & [88]. 
109 Chan Yu Nam (CA) (n 105) [93]. 
110 ibid. 
111 Chan Yu Nam (CFA AC) (n 106) [5]-[6]; Chan Yu Nam (CA) (n 106) [7]-[9]. 
112 Chan Yu Nam (CA) (n 105) [105]. 
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to the election reservation to the ICCPR.113  Justice Keith held that the reservation no longer 
had relevance after the Letters Patent was amended in 1995 to provide for an ‘elected’ 
LegCo.114  However, Justice Cheung in Chan Yu Nam noted that under Justice Keith’s 
approach (assuming it was correct) the reservation would be spent only from 1995, but of 
importance was that in 1990 when the Basic Law was promulgated, the election reservation 
had full effect in limiting the scope of the ICCPR political rights applicable to Hong Kong.115  
But, with respect, to freeze the meaning of fundamental rights to a snapshot of the legal 
position on the date of promulgation is to ignore the living tree principle of interpretation.116  
Article 26 rights are exercised in accordance with a dynamic law, which in this instance 
removes any constraint imposed by the election reservation once LegCo has become ‘elected’ 
(which has been the case since 1995).  What this achieves is the same scope of protection 
afforded by electoral rights in the Basic Law and HKBOR. 
 Swati Jhaveri notes that both courts ‘relied heavily on a historical approach to 
interpreting the provision’.117  However there is a subtle but important difference to how each 
made use of the historical context.  Stock VP relied upon historical context to test the 
applicants’ submission that the words of Article 26 intended to bring about a new state of 
affairs in which the right to vote in LegCo elections could only be conferred on individual 
permanent residents.  He found this context to provide no logical or realistic support for this 
position.118  Cheung J, on the other hand, referred to historical context to find that the drafters 
of the Basic Law and the National People’s Congress intended the pre-1995 practice of 
corporate voting to continue after 1997.119  From this finding, he leaped to the conclusion that 
Article 26 was never intended to apply to functional constituency elections.120  This leap, not 
found in Stock VP’s alternative view, goes too far and was unnecessary to decide the issue. 
 The applicant’s challenge based on permanent residency faced a steep hill from the 
outset, but it was regrettable the judges did not treat the challenge based on discrimination 
more seriously, having found shortcomings in the standing of the applicants (not being 
functional voters) to bring the challenge and in the terms of relief sought.121  As Jhaveri 
writes, the case ‘undermines the possibility of a more robust role for the various provisions in 
the Basic Law as tools for reducing the inequalities and anomalies in electoral rights’.122 
  
ELECTION COMMITTEE FOR THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
The election committee system for nominating and electing the chief executive is the least 
democratic electoral institution in Hong Kong, but also the most resistant to judicial review.  
It is criticised in the Chinese and English media as holding ‘small circle elections’, since the 
committee was as small as 400 individuals in 1996, grew to and stayed at 800 from 1998 to 
2011, and reached its present size of 1200 for the 2012 chief executive election.123  Critics of 
                                                
113 At the time of ratification, the UK qualified the rights in Art 25(b) ‘in so far as it may require the 
establishment of an elected Executive and Legislative Council in Hong Kong’.  See Andrew Byrnes and 
Johannes Chan (eds), Public Law and Human Rights: a Hong Kong Sourcebook (Butterworths 1993) 215, 262.  
114 Lee Miu Ling (HC) (n 72) 197-198.  
115 Chan Yu Nam (CFI) (n 103) [115]-[116]. 
116 Recognised in Ng Ka Ling v The Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4, [73]. 
117 Swati Jhaveri, ‘Judicialising politics: a role for the courts in electoral reform in Hong Kong’ [2011] Public 
Law 227, 232. 
118 Chan Yu Nam (CA) (n 105) [85]. 
119 Chan Yu Nam (CFI) (n 103) [82] & [87]. 
120 ibid [83] & [88]. 
121 ibid [120]-[137]; Chan Yu Nam (CA) (n 105) [109]-[115]. 
122 Jhaveri (n 117) 232. 
123 Simon NM Young and Richard Cullen, Electing Hong Kong’s Chief Executive (HKU Press 2010) app 2; 
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the chief executive, Mr. Leung Chun-ying, gave him the pejorative nickname ‘689’ to 
highlight the total number of votes he obtained to be elected.124 The 250,000 odd voters who 
elect committee members are delineated in an intricate arrangement of sectors and subsectors 
that reflect an expanded version of the functional constituencies; hence the system shares the 
problems and criticisms of functional constituencies and corporate voting.125  Elections in 
subsectors, when they are held, are unpopular; they have the lowest voter turnout rates of all 
elections in Hong Kong.126  Over 90 per cent of registered voters have no opportunity to 
participate in chief executive elections.127 
 It is a small improvement from the colonial era when the local population had no 
input on the selection of Hong Kong’s governor.  But the balance of interests amongst 
election committee members is such that the central government can decisively influence the 
final election result.  What gave people hope was that Article 45 of the Basic Law stated that 
the ‘ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon 
nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic 
procedures.’  In December 2007, these hopes grew stronger when the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) gave Hong Kong a timetable for universal suffrage: 
2017 for the chief executive and, if this was implemented, 2020 for LegCo.128  Pan-democrat 
legislators, who tend to make-up almost 40 per cent of all legislators, are typically the first to 
attack the legitimacy of chief executive elections, yet with the aim of universal suffrage in 
sight they fielded candidates in both the 2007 and 2012 elections.129  With the relatively low 
nomination threshold of 12.5 per cent, both candidates were nominated but with no chance of 
winning the election. 
 To everyone’s disappointment, all hopes of realising universal suffrage in 2017 were 
extinguished on 18 June 2015 when the pan-democrat legislators vetoed the government’s 
proposal for reform by precluding the two-thirds legislative majority needed to pass the 
proposal.130  The apparent irony of pan-democrat legislators vetoing democracy belies their 
principled objections against the nomination restrictions imposed by the NPCSC on 31 
August 2014.  Those restrictions (i.e. the nominating committee, taking the same size and 
form as the 2011 election committee, would nominate two to three candidates, each of whom 
must have majority support from committee members) would continue to give the central 
government de facto control over nominations.131  Pan-democrats could not accept this ‘fake’ 
system of universal suffrage, and the polls leading up to the vote showed that those who 
supported the veto had risen to more than 40 per cent.132 
                                                                                                                                                  
Republic of China Concerning the Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, 16th Sess, 11th National People’s Congress, 28 August 2010. 
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126 ibid 71-74. 
127 ibid 1. 
128 Decision of the NPCSC (n 66). 
129 Young and Cullen (n 123) 86-90; Suzanne Pepper, ‘A Chief Executive Election: pan-democrats and the 
Election Committee’, China Elections and Governance Blog, 16 January 2012, accessible at < 
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 No attempt has been made to challenge the core inequalities of the system of electing 
the chief executive, including the election committee.  From existing case law, the courts 
might follow three possible approaches to a judicial review of this system.  First, the court 
might hold that since the system (and change to the system) is so fully provided for in the 
Basic Law and the various decisions and interpretation of the NPCSC, no rights or other 
constitutional provisions could in any way be engaged by the operation of this system.  This 
approach would be similar to the one followed by Cheung J in Chan Yu Nam in holding that 
Article 26 did not apply to functional constituencies.   
 The second more nuanced approach is to hold that while the system cannot be 
challenged for failing to provide for equal and universal suffrage (because this has been 
specifically excepted), political and other rights can still be engaged by the operation of the 
system.  The focus would then be on justifying the reasonableness of any restriction.  This 
approach was followed by the Court of Appeal in Lee Miu Ling and by Stock VP in Chan Yu 
Nam.  Similarly, in a case concerning whether judicial review was available to challenge the 
outcome of a chief executive election, Justice Lam held that, by virtue of Article 45, Annex I 
of the Basic Law and various NPCSC decisions and interpretation, the right to election by 
equal and universal suffrage was not engaged, but the ‘concept of free election (‘freely 
chosen representatives’ and ‘free expression of the will of the electors’) is applicable to an 
election pursuant to Article 45’; there was a need to ensure ‘fundamental safeguards for free 
election’.133 
 The third approach is to follow the prisoner disqualification cases and treat the right 
to vote as being engaged by the system, whereupon the issue becomes one of reasonableness 
and proportionality.  It is highly unlikely, however, that this approach will be followed.  The 
second approach is to be preferred because it maintains a role for courts consistent with the 
dictates of the rule of law but has regard to constitutional realities.   
 With both the second and third approaches, there is still the issue of how rigorously 
will courts apply the justifications test.  As mentioned earlier, there is uncertainty in both the 
scope of the proportionality test and approach to margin of appreciation.  In one recent case, 
Leung Lai Kwok Yvonne v The Chief Secretary for Administration, that challenged not the 
system itself but the government’s consultation and 2015 universal suffrage proposal, margin 
of appreciation was given as a reason for refusing leave to apply for judicial review on 
grounds of prematurity.134  The applicant was a University of Hong Kong law student who 
argued that the government, in misapprehending the legal effect of the NPCSC’s August 31st 
decision, conducted a tainted public consultation that also failed to take into account relevant 
considerations, namely the rights in Articles 26 and 21, and thus unreasonably restricted 
those rights.  Justice Au refused leave on two grounds: immateriality (that the alleged correct 
understanding of the NPCSC’s decision would not have affected the consultation or proposal) 
and prematurity (that the challenge could still be brought after LegCo approved the proposal).  
To buttress the latter point, Justice Au reasoned that since election law is an area, on which ‘a 
due margin of appreciation’ is accorded, citing Chief Justice Geoffrey Ma’s judgment in 
Leung Chun Ying v Ho Chun Yan Albert, the matter should be allowed to be debated in 
LegCo before a court considers a review of the matter.135 
 
                                                
133 Ho Chun Yan, Albert v Leung Chun Ying [2012] 5 HKLRD 149, [60]-[61] & fn 6 (CFI). 
134 Leung Lai Kwok Yvonne v The Chief Secretary for Administration, unreported, HCAL31/2015, 5 June 2015, 
CFI.  See also Kwok Cheuk Kin v The Chief Executive of the HKSAR, unreported, HCAL103/2014, 25 June 
2015, CFI, where leave to challenge the fairness of the consultation process was also refused on the ground that 
it was academic after the NPCSC’s decision. 
135 Leung Lai Kwok Yvonne, ibid [57], applying Leung Chun Ying v Ho Chun Yan Albert (2013) 16 HKCFAR 
735, [45]. 
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Explaining the contradiction 
One way to begin to explain the contradiction in the Hong Kong courts’ strong review of 
restrictions and weak review of institutional inequality is to consider the consequences and 
impact of the cases.  The strong review cases addressed isolated disqualifying provisions that 
had limited policy support and could be struck down without too great an impact.  The weak 
review cases, however, challenged systemic inequalities and would have had significant 
institutional and policy ramifications.  But a distinction based only on the extent of the 
impact cannot account for the Court of Final Appeal’s strong review decision in Chan Wah, 
which had significant and transformative institutional ramifications for village elections, 
albeit outside the spheres of chief executive and LegCo elections. 
 A better approach is to consider the nature of the potential consequence.  Where the 
matter is of interest to the central government and within the scope of Hong Kong’s political 
reform trajectory, courts are likely to be hands off even where fundamental rights are 
engaged.  Village elections and disqualifying conditions, based on residency or conviction 
and punishment, are not reform issues along that trajectory, nor are they important enough to 
catch the central government’s interest.  However, functional constituencies, the election 
committee, the election of the chief executive and corporate voting are all matters of great 
interest to both the central and Hong Kong governments and reserved for consideration in the 
reform exercises leading to universal suffrage.  They are matters that go to the heart of the 
relationship between the central authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region and are of international importance.  They concern China’s authority over Hong 
Kong and, as stated in the August 31st decision, ‘the long-term prosperity and stability of 
Hong Kong and the sovereignty, security and development interests of the country are at 
stake’. 136   Thus they are matters that courts tolerate, even to the extent of holding 
fundamental rights in abeyance, while giving time and space to governments, legislators and 
the people to work out the proper way forward.   
 Hong Kong courts have adopted different strategies to tolerate and avoid confronting 
the institutional inequality in the political system.  One is to narrow the ambit of rights 
making them wholly inapplicable to certain types of elections under the Basic Law (Chan Yu 
Nam, per Cheung J).  Another is to refuse to extend the scope of the right unless that 
extension has support in legislative and historical contexts (Chan Yu Nam, per Stock VP).  A 
third is to find a derogation from a certain aspect of the right expressly condoned in another 
part of the constitution (Lee Miu Ling; Leung Chun Ying v Ho Chun Yan Albert, per Lam JA).  
A fourth is to apply a deferential proportionality test to find that the restriction on the right is 
justified (Lee Miu Ling; Kwok Cheuk Kin).  Whatever strategy is applied, the upshot is the 
appearance of a contradiction, that while rights matter, rights matter less when the issue lies 
along Hong Kong’s political reform trajectory, over which Beijing has great interest.   
 
 
Getting Beyond the Contradiction 
There are two ways for the contradiction to be resolved; each takes an opposite path.  The 
first path is for courts to take a robust approach to political rights in all cases and confront 
institutional inequality head on.  As Jhaveri argues it would involve courts drawing and 
upholding baselines even in hard cases.137  Yasmin Dawood has argued that courts can apply 
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a structural rights approach to address structural deficiencies of the political system.138  This 
would involve recognition of a new democratic right, the right to a fair and legitimate 
democratic process.139  However conceptualised, the courts on this path would adopt a more 
critical approach to deference and conduct a rigorous proportionality review to assess 
whether any restriction is no more than necessary.  Courts will be more inclined to question 
whether societal circumstances have changed so as to render past restrictions no longer 
reasonable.  Where it is reasonably practicable for government to devise a better scheme to 
achieve legislative aims, i.e. one that impairs rights less, then governments should be given a 
fair opportunity to achieve a new scheme after the legislation is struck down.  Constitutional 
remedies of temporary suspension or temporary validity will help further a dialogue between 
courts and government that aims to realise a new legal position informed by constitutional 
values and reasonable public policy.140 
 The other path sees courts becoming even more deferential, moving to a complete 
disengagement with entrenched political rights.  Functional constituencies and corporate 
voting have already been constitutionalised by courts or made immune from scrutiny.  Other 
areas, e.g. chief executive and election committee elections, will also become untouchable by 
courts.  This process is already occurring with the application of the margin of appreciation in 
recent cases.  In an almost automatic manner it has been said that since election law involves 
‘political and policy considerations’, a ‘due margin of appreciation’ must be accorded even if 
drawing a line may result in a few ‘hard cases’ with ‘detrimental effect on individuals’.141  
Where there has been active and full debate in the legislature, it was said, in the by-election 
disqualification case, ‘the proper place to resolve this political issue is LegCo and not the 
court’.142  Thus, on this path, all judicial reviews of elections become ‘political issues’ 
requiring a hands-off approach by the courts.  The only possible exception is if a core right 
was engaged, but political rights would not be regarded as core rights. 
 The 2014 Occupy Central protests and the 2015 failed political reform vote impacted 
people’s political awareness, expectations and perceptions of Hong Kong’s relationship with 
the mainland.  Will these events have any impact on the approach of courts to future judicial 
review of election cases?  The statements and actions of the central and Hong Kong 
governments may influence judges to take a more deferential path.  Unlike previous reform 
exercises, the central government played a prominent and assertive role in the reform debate.  
Foreign governments were told not to interfere with this internal matter.143  Both the central 
and Hong Kong governments asserted that there were no international standards relevant to 
the reform issue and, in any case, the election reservation rendered the ICCPR irrelevant.144  
The central government made clear that it wanted to control the nominations process in order 
to keep the vote outcome predictable and manageable.  Functional constituencies, corporate 
voting, the election committee structure, the restriction on the chief executive from being a 
member of a political party, and other aspects of the status quo would remain intact even after 
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the chief executive was elected by universal suffrage.145  No concessions would be made in 
response to public protests or to gain the support of pan-democrat legislators.146  These 
actions send a loud message to courts not to interfere under the guise of fundamental rights 
with an internal political matter in which the central government has a strong interest.   
 But all of these political statements and gestures amount to no more than that; they do 
not translate into legal edicts, though they may appear in legal submissions.  In remaining 
independent, courts apply the law and safeguard rights and freedoms of individuals.147  
Granted there will be occasions when Hong Kong judges may need to consider if their 
decisions will trigger a constitutional crisis, such as the one in 1999 when the NPCSC 
interpreted the Basic Law to reverse part of the Court of Final Appeal’s interpretation in the 
first right of abode case.148  But these occasions are rare and only of concern to the final 
court.  Experience has since been gained on how these controversial issues can be addressed 
in an orderly manner through the reference mechanism in Article 158 of the Basic Law.149  
Mindful of a strong public reaction and the detrimental effect on the rule of law, the Hong 
Kong government has not tried again to request an NPCSC interpretation to reverse a Court 
of Final Appeal interpretation.  
 Deference on grounds that the matter comes within Hong Kong’s political reform 
trajectory may need to be reconsidered if the path of that trajectory hits a hard wall.  If the 
relevant political actors are unable to realise the aim of universal suffrage, why should courts 
continue to hold rights in abeyance and tolerate deficient institutions while waiting for a 
political process that may never bear fruit?  While courts cannot, on their own, bring about 
universal suffrage, they can give effect to political rights in ways conducive to the gradual 
and orderly progress and development towards universal suffrage.  This would be consistent 
with the constitutional ambitions of Articles 45 and 68 of the Basic Law. 
 If the political reform trajectory hits a wall or diverts on an unknown course, courts 
need to move away from deference and to consider more carefully the relevant legal 
principles.  Recognised in Hong Kong law though rarely applied in the election cases, is the 
interpretive principle of conformity with binding international law.150  As Bennion puts it, ‘It 
is a principle of legal policy that the municipal law… should conform to public international 
law.’151 In relation to incorporating statutes like the HKBOR, Shaheed Fatima describes them 
as ‘portals through which treaties pass to be received into the corpus of domestic law’.152  By 
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virtue of this principle, international standards do matter in judicial review, and they have 
contributed to the results seen in the village elections and prisoners’ disqualification cases.  
The relevant international legal obligations are Articles 1 and 25 of the ICCPR, which are 
binding on China in relation to Hong Kong, by virtue of China’s acceptance of ICCPR 
obligations in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and notification to the UN at the time of the 
handover.153  The only exception to these obligations is the election reservation, which 
applies to Article 25(b).154  The precise effect and scope of this reservation remains unsettled 
in Hong Kong law.  Since a reservation’s effect is to restrict a right, the accepted approach on 
restrictions is to construe them narrowly.155  The narrow construction, accepted by the UN 
Human Rights Committee and Justice Keith in Lee Miu Ling, is that the reservation is spent 
once an election of any form is used to elect legislators and the chief executive.156  A less 
narrow interpretation, which would allow it to still have substantive effect, is to reserve 
against the whole of Article 25 any rights to elect the chief executive, members of the 
executive council, and members of LegCo by universal suffrage.  This would be consistent 
with the letter and spirit of Articles 45, 55 and 68 of the Basic Law.  However, the rights in 
Article 25 can still be engaged by unfairness or inequality in the electoral system so long as 
the complaint does not seek substantively to realise universal suffrage. 
 Another aspect of deference which higher courts will need to review in the near future 
is the knee-jerk reaction to defer because the election law context is said to involve ‘political 
and policy considerations’.  Recent judgments exhibiting this tendency have tried to find 
support from the Court of Final Appeal’s decisions in Fok Chun Wa v The Hospital Authority 
and Leung Chun Ying v Ho Chun Yan Albert.157  However on a close reading of both 
judgments, neither provides support for the knee-jerk reaction, which has had the effect of 
devaluing political rights in Hong Kong’s constitutional framework.  Fok Chun Wa was 
concerned with whether it was discriminatory to charge non-resident women from the 
mainland, who were awaiting residency status, higher fees than those charged to Hong Kong 
residents for delivering a child in a Hong Kong public hospital.  In its analysis the Court 
considered how much deference should be accorded when the justification issue concerned 
socio-economic policy and the distribution of public funds.  Chief Justice Geoffrey Ma noted 
that courts should allow more leeway when the context concerned ‘socio-economic or other 
general policy matters’.158  But courts would be more stringent in the application of the 
justification test in two categories of cases: (1) if the government’s socio-economic or general 
policy has ‘disregard for core-values’; or (2) if the subject matter of the challenge is 
concerned with ‘fundamental concepts, in contradistinction to rights associated with social 
and economic policies’.159  In relation to the first category, core-values relate ‘to personal or 
human characteristics (such as race, colour, gender, sexual orientation, religion, politics, or 
social origin)’; they involve ‘the respect and dignity that society accords to a human being’ 
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and are ‘fundamental societal values’.160  In relation to the second category, fundamental 
concepts are ‘those which go to the heart of any society’ and include ‘the right to life, the 
right not to be tortured, the right not to be held in slavery, the freedom of expression and 
opinion, freedom of religion (among others)’.161  The right to a fair trial and presumption of 
innocence was also mentioned.  Although political rights were not expressly mentioned by 
the Chief Justice, core-values can be triggered in right to vote cases by virtue of the non-
discrimination clause in Article 21 of the HKBOR, and political rights are closely connected 
to freedoms of expression and opinion, which were expressly mentioned.  
 The Court revisited the concept of margin of appreciation in Leung Chun Ying v Ho 
Chun Yan Albert, a case concerned with election law but not political rights.  At issue was 
whether the seven-day time limit to lodge an election petition with the court to question a 
chief executive election infringed the right of access to the courts protected by Article 35 of 
the Basic Law.  There was no discretion to extend the time limit.  The Court found the 
inflexible time limit to be a justified restriction on the access right.  It noted that election 
petitions were made as of right, that it was important to have these challenges dealt with 
speedily, that the overall scheme also allowed for limited judicial review within 30 days, that 
persons likely to file the petition would be intimately involved in the election and could be 
expected to comply with the time limit, and that other jurisdictions had comparable limits.162  
All of these reasons were stated in the Chief Justice’s judgment before he addressed margin 
of appreciation in a short paragraph.163  He referred to his decision in Fok Chun Wa and 
found that a due margin of appreciation should be accorded because elections ‘involve 
political and policy considerations and it is in these areas where the legislature is involved’ 
and the determination of the seven-day limit ‘is one that does involve considerations other 
than legal ones’.164  As to whether the issue concerned core-values or fundamental concepts, 
the Chief Justice did not address the question directly, noting only that ‘the right of access to 
the courts is not an unlimited one, particularly in the present context’;165 this suggests a 
difficulty with conditioning the margin on the nature or type of right or issue involved.  The 
case did not comment on the value or importance of political rights. 
 Neither of these two decisions can be read as authority for judicial deference in every 
case concerning political rights, which can hardly be said to ‘rights associated with purely 
social and economic policies’.166  Relating to political and policy considerations may be one 
reason to allow the legislature some leeway, but the crucial prior question is whether the 
political right engaged is a ‘fundamental concept’, in which case courts should be more 
vigilant in protecting the fundamental right at stake.  In considering this question, courts 
should bear in mind the following three aspects of political rights.  First, it is often said that 
political rights serve to guarantee and protect other human rights.167  ‘It figures in the 
International Covenant as a right so fundamental that the realization of many others depends 
upon it.’168  Second, political rights are inextricably tied to other fundamental freedoms such 
that their restriction inevitably impacts on those other freedoms.  ‘[T]he expressive rights to 
free speech, press, assembly and association must in some way inform any theory of 
participation.  Their prominence in the International Covenant reminds us that Article 25 
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should not be approached as an isolated provision, detached from the larger structure of rights 
in the Covenant.’169  Third, in the context of one country, two systems, the political rights 
exemplify Hong Kong’s ‘separate system’, and Hong Kong courts, following the approach in 
Ng Ka Ling, should give a ‘generous interpretation’ to such rights.170  The wide expression of 
views from the community during the 2013-2015 reform exercise, whether in support or 
against the government’s proposal, is validation of the great importance of political rights and 
democratic institutions to Hong Kong people. 
  
 
Conclusion 
Like Hong Kong’s journey on the road to democracy, judicial review of elections has also 
experienced a bumpy ride.  Its current state of contradiction reflects a broader tension 
between Hong Kong’s robust and international approach to constitutional rights review and 
China’s authoritative approach to Hong Kong’s political development.  After the 2015 reform 
veto, there has been no official indication of when the universal suffrage reform process will 
begin again.  Before too long, those frustrated with the deadlock in the political process will 
turn to courts seeking a consideration (or reconsideration) of the longstanding institutional 
inequalities in the political system.  A dismissive response would render political rights under 
the Basic Law illusory and bring the two systems closer together, instead of marking their 
separateness.  A too robust approach might provoke undesirable interference from the central 
government.  The best way is to give Hong Kong permanent residents the full measure of 
their political rights by considering rights challenges with the same intensive scrutiny applied 
in previous cases concerned with the fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly, and 
association.171  Under this approach courts need not attempt to design or redesign political 
institutions.  The articulation of legal principles that reflect the underlying purposes of Article 
21 can serve as a catalyst for gradual progress in the direction of universal suffrage. 
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